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DIVORCE WITHOUT MARRIAGE: THE SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION ANOMALY IN CALIFORNIA
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing trend in the law toward paralegalism
and self-representation in areas formerly the exclusive domain
of the professional. One of the largest areas of the law in which
this trend is evident is litigation involving domestic relations.
An individual need only go to the nearest bookstore to procure
a volume which sets out step-by-step the procedure to follow
to obtain a dissolution, an annulment, or a modification of
prior decrees. The legal fees thus saved by do-it-yourself di-
vorce manuals attracts more and more in propia persona advo-
cates to the courts every day. Unfortunately, however, the law
often lays traps for the unwary-traps into which even the most
experienced practitioner may fall, and which are certain to
ambush the neophyte. Once caught, the litigant may find no
avenue of escape, for judicial economy requires that contro-
versy must end at some point.
This comment deals with one legal pitfall in the domestic
relations area which generates much fruitless litigation: a de-
cree purporting to dissolve an invalid marriage. What typically
transpires is this: two individuals purport to marry, but fail to
satisfy some procedural requirement and thus are never legally
married. Subsequently, marital difficulties arise and one of the
parties sues for divorce.' Based on the parties' alleged married
status, the divorce court assumes subject matter jurisdiction
over the action, grants a divorce and divides the parties' prop-
erty. However, since a prerequisite to the court's subject matter
jurisdiction is a determination by the court that the parties
were in fact validly married,2 the divorce court's decree is, in
effect, invalid. Later, one of the parties to the action discovers
the inherent invalidity of the marriage and seeks to have the
divorce decree overturned. The court bars the party from as-
serting his or her contention by applying the doctrines of res
judicata or equitable estoppel-and the trap is closed.
It is easy to conceive how readily one may become en-
meshed in this process, for by applying res judicata or equita-
1. While the California Family Law Act discarded the use of "divorce" in favor
of the term "dissolution" in order to reflect the no-fault nature of actions severing
marital relations, these terms will be used interchangeably in this comment.
2. See text accompanying notes 4-23 infra.
129
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ble estoppel, the court is juggling established rules of law in
order to reach an arguably desirable, though anomalous, result.
The parties to the action, in effect, have been permitted to
confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court through their
consent and have impliedly waived their right to raise the issue
of the jurisdictional defect on appeal. Further, by thus foreclos-
ing attack on the divorce decree, the court often lends a spe-
cious ex post facto validity to two or even three other invalid
acts of the parties or the courts.3
This comment will discuss the ramifications of a divorce
decree purporting to dissolve an invalid marriage. Determina-
tions in a given factual situation may hinge on collateral ques-
tions, such as conflicts of law. Discussion of such questions will
be severely limited, the focus of the analysis being the laws of
California.
This comment does not purport to offer a conclusive reso-
lution of issues discussed. The decisions of courts confronted
with the problem follow no logical pattern; earlier decisions
which are held to be precedent often are ignored or rejected
outright by trial courts intent on achieving a just result in light
of the particular facts of each case. However, the solutions
adopted by the courts in this haphazard pursuit of an equitable
outcome are, in many instances, of questionable worth in light
of the collateral consequences they entail.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Initially, it should be noted that the state has a sufficient
interest in the status of its domiciliaries to grant them appro-
priate relief in controversies involving their marital relations.
Since marriage is a matter of public concern, the state's inter-
est extends both to its formation and its dissolution.' In order
to promote this interest, the state has enacted legislation set-
ting forth the circumstances under which a marriage will be
declared to be at an end' and the manner in which the parties'
3. For example, where one of the parties formerly was legally married but ob-
tained an invalid divorce in another jurisdiction, this trap precludes the party from
contesting not only the invalid second divorce, but also the invalid first divorce and
invalid second marriage.
4. Haas v. Haas, 227 Cal. App. 2d 615, 617, 38 Cal. Rptr. 811, 812 (1964); see
Rehfuss v. Rehfuss, 169 Cal. 86, 145 P. 1020 (1915); Armstrong, The California Law of
Marriage and Divorce: A Survey, 19 ST. B.J. 160, 162 (1944).
5. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4350 (West 1974); see Vasquez v. Vasquez, 109 Cal. App. 2d
280, 283, 240 P.2d 319, 320 (1952).
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community property and other incidents of marriage will be
disposed of.' The power of the state to enter a decree of dissolu-
tion is given effect by the judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction decreeing a dissolution of the marriage.'
The courts, in construing this grant of power and setting
out the requisites of subject matter jurisdiction, have stated
that a prerequisite to a judgment of dissolution is a finding
establishing the matrimonial relation: that is, the existence of
the res.5 The existence of a valid marriage (the res) has thus
been held to be a jurisdictional prerequisite to the court's right
in an action for divorce or separate maintenance to order sup-
port, to award costs and counsel fees,9 and ultimately, to grant
a dissolution and to divide the community property.'" This
requirement is logical, for if a valid marriage were not a prere-
quisite to the court's power to grant a dissolution, the court
would, in effect, be declaring an end to a relationship which
never existed.
As a practical matter, however, the necessary "finding" of
a valid marriage is made without any investigation by the court
of the fact of marriage. Rather, the court ordinarily accepts
prima facie the parties' representation of a valid marriage. Al-
though it has long been held that parties to an action cannot
confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a court by consent,"
waiver, 2 or even stipulation, 3 the representation of the parties
6. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4351 et seq. (West 1974); Vasquez v. Vasquez, 109 Cal. App.
2d 280, 240 P.2d 319 (1952).
7. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4350(2) (West 1974).
8. Borg v. Borg, 25 Cal. App. 2d 25, 29, 76 P.2d 218, 220 (1938); see Delanoy v.
Delanoy, 216 Cal. 27, 13 P.2d 719 (1932).
9. Colbert v. Colbert, 28 Cal. 2d 276, 279, 169 P.2d 633, 635 (1946); Hinson v.
Hinson, 100 Cal. App. 2d 745, 746, 224 P.2d 405, 406 (1950); Parman v. Parman, 56
Cal. App. 2d 67, 69, 132 P.2d 851, 852 (1942); In re Cook, 42 Cal. App. 2d 1, 3, 108
P.2d 46, 47 (1940); cf. Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal. 2d 497, 502-503, 261 P.2d 276, 278
(1953); Carbone v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal. 2d 768, 771, 117 P.2d 872, 874 (1941); Carter
v. Carter, 192 Cal. App. 2d 838, 844, 13 Cal. Rptr. 922, 925 (1961).
10. See Turknette v. Turknette, 100 Cal. App. 2d 271, 274, 223 P.2d 495, 498
(1950); cf. Carter v. Carter, 192 Cal. App. 2d 838, 13 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1961).
11. Harrington v. Superior Ct., 194 Cal. 185, 188, 228 P. 15, 16 (1924); cf. Harper,
The Validity of Void Divorces, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 158, 165 (1930).
12. The law in question in this case, as we have construed it, is a
limitation upon the power of the court with respect to the subject-matter,
so that the court shall not be competent to grant a final divorce at any
time during the year succeeding the interlocutory judgment, and so as to
require that the interlocutory judgment be first entered. The parties
could not waive the proceedings, nor invest power in the court by their
consent or acquiescence.
Grannis v. Superior Ct., 146 Cal. 245, 254, 79 P. 891, 895 (1905); see Miller v. Miller,
52 Cal. App. 2d 443, 126 P.2d 357 (1942).
13. Miller v. Miller, 52 Cal. App. 2d 443, 444, 126 P.2d 357, 358 (1942).
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in effect operates to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
court by consent or waiver of the jurisdictional issue. The fact
that the parties to the action may have thought they were
married is of no legal consequence, since the jurisdictional de-
fect precludes entry of a valid divorce decree.
Of course, where the parties to the action raise the issue
of the marriage's validity in an adversary context and such
issue is fully litigated, clearly the court has jurisdiction to enter
a valid decree of dissolution if it finds the marriage existed.
However, if one of the parties defaults, or the parties merely
represent to the court that they are married and the representa-
tion is accepted without evidence or inquiry, the crucial "find-
ing" is pro forma; should the representation-and thus the
"finding"-later prove inaccurate, one can genuinely maintain
that the court's power to act was conferred by the actions of the
parties. 4 Properly, it is incumbent upon the court to determine
its position in relation to jurisdictional parameters, not the
parties to the action.
When a court in California acts without subject matter
jurisdiction, the consequences of its act are often far-reaching,
since California looks to the laws of the state where the mar-
riage was entered into to determine its validity." If the Califor-
nia court does not make a factually based determination of the
existence of a valid marriage, but rather relies on the represen-
tation of one or both of the parties, the California divorce court
may be validating a heretofore meaningless act by the parties
in another state," a power which it does not have. If the parties
were never married under the laws of their former domicile, the
fact that they are now able to obtain a divorce decree in Cali-
fornia is a retroactive, extraterritorial conferral of married sta-
tus upon the parties by the California court. The situation is
even more serious if the invalidity of the foreign marriage was
14. See Troxell v. Troxell, 237 Cal. App. 2d 147, 151-52, 46 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725-
26 (1965); Carter v. Carter, 192 Cal. App. 2d 838, 13 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1961); Warburton
v. Kieferle, 135 Cal. App. 2d 278, 287 P.2d 1 (1955).
15. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4104 (West 1975); see Whealton v. Whealton, 67 Cal. 2d
656, 664, 432 P.2d 979, 984, 63 Cal. Rptr. 291, 296 (1967); Jones v. Jones, 182 Cal. App.
2d 80, 82, 5 Cal. Rptr. 803, 804 (1960); Estate of Kieg, 59 Cal. App. 2d 812, 816, 140
P.2d 163, 165 (1943); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121
(1934); The Supreme Court of California 1967-1968, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1612, 1745 (1968);
cf. Hospelhorn v. Van Dusen, 40 Cal. App. 2d 257, 259, 104 P.2d 888, 889 (1940).
16. Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620, 625, 54 P. 143, 145 (1898); Interstate
Lumber Co. v. Tweedy, 28 Cal. App. 2d 208, 82 P.2d 208 (1938); 2 J. BEALE, THE
CONFLICTS OF LAW 669-70 (1935); cf. Barrons v. United States, 191 F.2d 92 (9th Cir.
1951).
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due to the entry of a defective decree of divorce as to one of the
parties prior to the alleged marriage. In such a situation, a
divorce decree issued by the California court would not only be
validating a marriage void under the laws of the state where it
was performed, but it would also effectively validate the prior
divorce decree. Since, as will be discussed below, the parties
are foreclosed from attacking the California divorce decree, the
court is compounding and pyramiding invalidities.
The consequences of the California court's entry of a di-
vorce decree in the situation presented do not end there. In
addition, the enforceability of the decree in sister states is seri-
ously endangered. The courts of a sister state are not obliged
to recognize and enforce the decree by the California court
under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Con-
stitution if it can be established that such judgment was en-
tered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction and the
judgment is thereby subject to attack in the rendering state.17
Since California both allows'8 and bars 9 attack on a divorce
decree entered without subject matter jurisdiction, the courts
of another jurisdiction would be hard pressed to determine the
enforceability of the California decree.
The United States Supreme Court has provided little
guidance as to the application of the full faith and credit clause
of the United States Constitution where a court fails to deter-
mine the existence of a valid marriage and thus lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. In Sherrer v. Sherrer,20 the Court held that
where the parties are present and have an opportunity to liti-
gate the jurisdictional question the decree is entitled to full
faith and credit. However, this decision turned on a question
of the parties' domicile. The jurisdictional prerequisite which
we are discussing here is not the domicile of the parties, but
rather, the existence of the marriage. Thus, there exists at least
the possibility that a party to a California dissolution may be
able to avoid its effect by moving to a sister state which would
interpret California law as allowing attack on the decree.
17. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muhlberger, 340 U.S. 581, 587
(1951); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); see Comment, Stranger At-
tack on Sister State Decrees of Divorce, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 376 (1957); cf Mott v.
Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, 407 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1969); Kegley v.
Kegley, 16 Cal. App. 2d 216, 220, 60 P.2d 482, 484 (1936). But cf. Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334 U.S. 343, 350 (1948).
18. See notes 24-38 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 39-63 and accompanying text infra.
20. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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Some commentators have argued that no special sanctity
should be given jurisdictional limitations,"' or that decisions
rendered when the court was without jurisdiction should be
countenanced as awards in actions for dissolution." While this
viewpoint acknowledges that the court's lack of jurisdiction
deprives it of power to act as a court, the argument urges that
the decision of the court should be viewed in the same light as
an arbitration award and so binding on the parties. The deci-
sion thus establishes the rights of the parties and puts an end
to the controversy. Some courts on the other hand, rely on a
presumption that a decree is valid where it does not appear
affirmatively that a jurisdictional defect was present. Of
course, such arguments can be made as to any decision of a
court which acts without jurisdiction. To carry the argument
to its logical, albeit absurd end, why have any jurisdictional
restraints upon a court at all?
It is an unfortunate circumstance, though perhaps to be
expected, that law and equity may not produce a just result in
every instance. But when rules of law and the principles of
equity which the courts themselves have set forth prove ineffec-
tual in dealing with anomalies within their realm, one must
question their present value.
DIRECT AND COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON INVALID DECREES
Direct Attack
Generally, when a court acts without jurisdiction over the
parties or subject matter, or grants relief in excess of its power,
the resulting judgment is a nullity.24 Such a judgment is nor-
mally attacked in cases where the parties have mistakenly con-
sented to the rendition of a judgment which the court had no
power to enter, by a motion made directly to the rendering
court pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section
473,25 or by way of suit in equity independent of that section.26
21. E.g., Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October Term,
1939, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1006, 1010 (1939).
22. Gavit, Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata, 80 U. PA. L. REV.
386 (1932).
23. Green v. Green, 100 F.2d 241, 242 (9th Cir. 1938); Olivia v. Suglio, 139 Cal.
App. 2d 7, 8-9, 293 P.2d 63, 65 (1956). But cf. Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal. 2d 497, 504,
261 P.2d 269, 272 (1953).
24. Hunter v. Superior Ct., 36 Cal. App. 2d 100, 112, 97 P.2d 492, 499, (1939);
see Vasquez v. Vasquez, 109 Cal. App. 2d 280, 282, 240 P.2d 319, 320 (1952).
25. "The court may, upon motion of the injured party or its own motion, correct
[Vol. 16
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The necessity for a court's re-examination of its decree is even
more compelling where the court has made an implied, non-
adversary finding of a valid marriage, as where one of the par-
ties has entered his consent to the divorce."
While a void judgment also may be attacked by a motion
for a new trial or by appeal," section 473 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure is the quickest, most direct method of cor-
recting an error of the trial court. It allows the trial court to re-
examine its decision on its own or a party's motion to deter-
mine whether it acted within its grant of authority. This pro-
cess allows the party allegedly aggrieved by the judgment the
opportunity to avoid the lengthy appellate process. Of course,
section 473 merely codifies the inherent power of a court to
entertain a suit in equity to set aside a void judgment, and need
not be utilized by a party directly attacking the judgment. 9
This procedure applies to both interlocutory and final decrees
of divorce."
Vacation of a decree pursuant to section 473 of the Califor-
clerical mistakes in its judgment or order directed and may on the motion of either
party set aside any void judgment of order." CAL. Civ. PRo. CODE § 473 (West 1974).
26. Mechanics Bank v. Thole, 20 Cal. App. 3d 884, 886, 98 Cal. Rptr. 82, 83
(1971) (motion to set aside judgment on a promissory note); Adamson v. Adamson,
209 Cal. App. 2d 492, 500, 26 Cal. Rptr. 236, 242 (1962) (order modifying an interlocu-
tory judgment of divorce reversed because issues determined were res judicata); Heath-
nam v. Vant, 172 Cal. App. 2d 639, 648, 343 P.2d 104, 109 (1959) (motion to set aside
and annul interlocutory and final decrees of divorce pursuant to section 473 and in
equity independent of that section); cf. People ex rel. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Ryerson,
241 Cal. App. 2d 115, 119, 122-23, 50 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249, 252 (1966) (decision for
shipper set aside on grounds of fraud and lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Neces-
sary v. Necessary, 207 Cal. App. 2d 780, 782, 24 Cal. Rptr. 713, 714 (1962) (motion to
set aside entry of a default judgment of divorce pursuant to section 473 based on
fraud).
27. Challenge in the lower court is even more essential when the invalidity of
the judgment is dependent upon extrinsic facts which the lower court did not have the
opportunity to consider. Frazier v. Wasserman, 263 Cal. App. 2d 120, 123, 69 Cal. Rptr.
510, 512 (1968) (collateral attack on judgment of bankruptcy court); cf. Carbone v.
Superior Ct., 18 Cal. 2d 769, 771-72, 117 P.2d 872, 874 (1942); Sharon v. Sharon, 75
Cal. 1, 16 P. 345 (1888).
28. Adamson v. Adamson, 209 Cal. App. 2d 492, 500, 26 Cal. Rptr. 236, 242,
(1962); Heathnam v. Vant, 172 Cal. App. 2d 639, 648, 343 P.2d 104, 109 (1959).
29. See cases cited note 26 supra. Since equity may act to overcome a void
judgment, the statute of limitations prescribed in section 473 will not bar an attack
on a void judgment nor will the doctrine of laches. Estate of Pusey, 180 Cal. 368, 181
P. 648 (1917); Estate of Poder, 274 Cal. App. 2d 786, 79 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1969); Garrison
v. Blanchard, 127 Cal. App. 616, 16 P. 2d 273 (1932); cf. Colbert v. Colbert, 28 Cal. 2d
276, 169 P.2d 633 (1946); Hinson v. Hinson, 100 Cal. App. 2d 745, 224 P.2d 405 (1950).
30. Bancroft v. Bancroft, 178 Cal. 367, 368, 173 P. 579, 581 (1918); Suttman v.
Superior Ct., 174 Cal. 243, 244, 162 P. 1032, 1032 (1917); Deyle v. Deyle, 88 Cal. App.
2d 536, 539, 199 P.2d 424, 425-26 (1948); Estate of Hughes, 80 Cal. App. 2d 550, 555,
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nia Code of Civil Procedure or by equitable action rests within
the discretion of the trial court.3' In exercising their discretion
under section 473, the courts often overlook the fact that the
existence of the marriage is a prerequisite to their obtaining
subject matter jurisdiction. The parties attacking an invalid
decree may compound the court's oversight by failing to raise
the lack of a valid marriage in a jurisdictional context. Since
the jurisdictional character of the existence of the marriage is
not readily perceived, the court may subsequently deny the
motion out of hand, or erect the bars of res judicata or equitable
estoppel. In doing so, the court validates the marriage regard-
less of the true state of facts.32
Collateral Attack
California law gives further relief from a judgment or de-
cree which is void for want of jurisdiction, by providing in
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1916, that "[a]ny
judicial record may be impeached by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction in the court, or judicial officer, or collusion between
the parties or of fraud in the party offering the record in respect
to the proceedings."33 Generally speaking, a judgment will be
set aside upon collateral attack "for but one of three reasons:
lack of jurisdiction of the person, lack of jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the action, or an absolute lack of jurisdiction
to render such judgment as the one given." 4
However, when the courts look at interlocutory or final
decrees of divorce, collateral attack is limited strictly to the
grounds specified in section 1916; such judgments are otherwise
immune from collateral attack. 5 Grounds such as extrinsic
fraud or undue influence between the parties are ineffectual to
overturn the decree.36
182 P.2d 253, 257 (1947); Borg v. Borg, 25 Cal. App. 2d 25, 29, 76 P.2d 218, 220-21
(1938); cf. Troxell v. Troxell, 237 Cal. App. 2d 147, 151, 46 Cal. Rptr. 723, 726 (1965).
31. Olson v. Olson, 148 Cal. App. 2d 479, 483, 306 P.2d 1036, 1039 (1957). See
cases cited note 30 supra.
32. Petry v. Petry, 47 Cal. App. 2d 594, 595, 118 P.2d 498, 499 (1941); see Dietrich
v. Dietrich, 41 Cal. 2d 497, 504, 261 P.2d 269, 273 (1953).
33. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1916 (West 1974).
34. Baldwin v. Fosser, 157 Cal. 643, 646, 108 P. 714, 716 (1910).
35. Kelsey v. Miller, 203 Cal. 66, 91, 263 P. 200, 212 (1928); Estate of Lee, 200
Cal. 310, 314, 253 P. 145, 147 (1927); Borg v. Borg, 25 Cal. App. 2d 25, 29, 76 P.2d 218,
220 (1938); cf. Estate of Casimir, 19 Cal. App. 3d 773, 780, 97 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (1971);
Frazier v. Wasserman, 263 Cal. App. 2d 120, 69 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1968); Vasquez v.
Vasquez, 109 Cal. App. 2d 280, 283, 240 P.2d 319, 320-21 (1952).
36. Id.
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Here, again, courts and attorneys often overlook the fun-
damental nature of a factual determination of a valid marriage
as a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction. Attorneys tend
to point to the fact that the couple were never married while
failing to assert that, as a result, the court entering the decree
did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. They point
to the illogical aspect of the situation, the absurdity of retroac-
tively conferring a status on the parties which they never had;
but they fail to indicate the jurisdictional character of a valid
marriage. Courts, on the other hand, also fail to perceive the
fundamental nature of a factual determination of a valid mar-
riage. A party is often barred from raising the invalidity of the
marriage as grounds for overturning the divorce decree because
the court sees this as a simple question of fact or procedure and
not as a question of jurisdiction. This result contradicts the
principles set forth above, as well as the principle that ques-
tions as to the subject matter of a court may be raised for the
first time on appeal 37 and are never waived.38
RES JUDICATA
When a court, subsequent to the entry of a decree of disso-
lution, applies the rule of res judicata, it bars the parties or
their privies to the action from relitigating all issues that were
or could have been litigated, including the parties' status with
relation to each other. 39 The language of the court of appeal in
Petry v. Petry4° indicates the force with which res judicata is
applied and represents the most rigid stance the courts have
adopted.
It is well established in this state that a final decree of
divorce conclusively determines, as between the parties
thereto that they were legally married and this is true re-
gardless of the true fact . ..and seemingly despite the
most flagrant fraud practiced by one of the parties. Such
37. Colbert v. Colbert, 28 Cal. 2d 276, 279, 169 P.2d 633, 635 (1946); Frazier v.
Wasserman, 263 Cal. App. 2d 120, 123, 69 Cal. Rptr. 510, 512, (1968); Hinson v.
Hinson, 100 Cal. App. 2d 745, 746, 224 P.2d 405, 406 (1920); see Parman v. Parman,
56 Cal. App. 2d 67, 132 P.2d 85 (1942); Borg v. Borg, 25 Cal. App. 2d 25, 76 P.2d 218
(1938).
38. See note 12 supra.
39. Redicker v. Redicker, 35 Cal. 2d 796, 801, 221 P.2d 1, 4 (1950); cf. Sherrer v.
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Kelsey v. Miller, 203 Cal. 61, 263 P. 200 (1928); Estate
of Lee, 200 Cal. 310, 253 P. 145 (1927); 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Husband and Wife § 52, at 4947 (8th ed. 1974); see note 17 supra.
40. 47 Cal. App. 2d 594, 118 P.2d498 (1941).
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being the case, the decree of divorce may not be collater-
ally attacked by the parties thereto and all the facts
therein found, such as the fact of marriage, are conclusive
upon the parties in subsequent proceedings whether they
pertain to divorce or not.4"
This practice of supplying a court retroactively with sub-
ject matter jurisdiction through the application of res judicata
has caused confusion in the courts. Often, a court will state
that a prior decree of divorce is res judicata as to the status of
the parties, but will allow attack on the decree on grounds of
subject matter jurisdiction." Clearly, this evidences the court's
misunderstanding of the law in this area. Since without juris-
diction the resulting judgment is a nullity, it is obvious that the
court fails to perceive that a factual determination of marital
status is a prerequisite not simply to subject matter jurisdic-
tion, but also to the adjudication of status.
Confusion arises because a valid marriage is necessary for
jurisdiction in addition to domicile. A valid marriage estab-
lishes the existence of the res; domicile establishes that the res
is within the state, and thus subject to the court's power. While
domicile thus does supply one element of subject matter juris-
diction, it is not the only ground which can be used to show
want of jurisdiction pursuant to section 1916,11 a fact consis-
tently overlooked.
Yet more difficulty develops because many divorces pres-
ently are being litigated by the parties themselves without the
aid of attorneys. It is unlikely a lay person would perceive a
jurisdictional issue, much less place it properly before the
court. Certainly, if the party claiming lack of subject matter
jurisdiction presented the issue to the trial court in an adver-
sary context, he or she should subsequently be barred from
collaterally attacking the decree on those grounds, but it seems
self-serving to allow the court to seize jurisdiction by reason of
the parties' ignorance, and unfair to penalize that ignorance so
severely. It should be incumbent on the trial court to establish
the fact that it has power to proceed. That is, the court should
require the parties to provide sufficient information to enable
the court to examine the facts surrounding the marriage, prior
divorces, and other relevant events. Were this done, a claim
41. Id. at 595, 118 P.2d at 499.
42. See cases cited note 35 supra.
43. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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that subject matter jurisdiction was conferred on the court by
the parties' representation or consent would be wholly spe-
cious; if the court failed to uncover the inherent invalidity of
the marriage, at least the factual basis for the jurisdictional
claims would have been presented and examined.
Such action would protect both the court and the parties.
The court would not be acting without jurisdiction, and the
parties would not run the risk of having conferred upon them
a status they never had. Such an inquiry would certainly save
much judicial time either at that moment or in future litiga-
tion. Property settlements would accord with the parties real,
factually based status, rather than with their mistaken status.
Collateral areas such as the validity of antenuptial agree-
ments,44 due to certain presumptions which arise only upon
marriage,45 might be greatly affected. For instance, the pre-
sumption that there is a confidential relationship between mar-
ried individuals" would not arise. Thus, the rules setting forth
the presumption of fraud or undue influence where one married
party has gained an advantage over the other" would not
apply. Finally, settled principles of law would not have to be
so severely strained to reach questionable results.
It has been argued that res judicata, in a sense, is an award
in and of itself and not necessarily a validation of a court's prior
invalid decree where the trial court acted without some juris-
dictional requisite. This argument places the judge in the role
of arbitrator: an individual acting without state authority but
upholding the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes.
While the state is not bound by the judge's decision, the parties
are held to the rights and interests they have been awarded
once res judicata applies to foreclose attack upon and to sanc-
tion the ruling.48
This bit of legal sophistry fails to explain adequately the
44. Kenney v. Kenney, 220 Cal. 134, 30 P.2d 398 (1934); Estate of Cover, 188 Cal.
133, 204 P.583 (1922); Estate of Dokoozlian, 219 Cal. App. 2d 531, 33 Cal. Rptr. 151
(1963); Estate of Cummins, 130 Cal. App. 2d 821, 280 P. 128 (1955); Handley v.
Handley, 113 Cal. App. 2d 280, 248 P.2d 59 (1952); Estate of Piatt, 81 Cal. App. 2d
348, 183 P.2d 919 (1948).
45. Estate of Cover, 188 Cal. 133, 204 P. 583 (1922); Morris v. Berman, 159 Cal.
App. 2d 770, 324 P.2d 601 (1958); Patterson v. Davis, 121 Cal. App. 2d 152, 262 P.2d
681 (1953); Handley v. Handley, 113 Cal. App. 2d 280, 248 P.2d 59 (1952); Marsiglia
v. Marsiglia, 78 Cal. App. 2d 701, 178 P.2d 478 (1947).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Gavit, Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata, 80 U. PA. L. REV.
158 (1932).
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real reason that courts apply the doctrine of res judicata,
thereby barring a party from asserting an otherwise valid
claim. The function of the res judicata rule is to put an end to
litigation that might otherwise drag on indefinitely through a
series of collateral attacks. 9 Difficulties arise as to when and
where to apply the rule, but it was not designed to confer juris-
diction nor to give ex post facto validity to decisions that the
court was without power to make. Necessarily it is a judge who,
in the exercise of his discretion, ultimately decides the point at
which res judicata will be applied. Perhaps it is this element
of uncertainty, coupled with the distortion to which settled
jurisdictional requisites must be subjected in order to utilize
res judicata, which has led the preferred use of equitable estop-
pel to bar attack on an invalid decree.
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
Initially, it should be noted that while a party under pro-
per circumstances may be estopped to deny personal jurisdic-
tion,"0 subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a
court by estoppel." However, in dissolution actions, the courts
consistently overlook this principle and hold that while the
application of estoppel does not validate an invalid marriage,
the party is estopped from asserting that the dissolution was
invalid. 2 The effect is to confer subject matter jurisdiction
where it did not in fact exist. This abrogation of settled princi-
ples is said to be justified by the conduct of the parties.53 That
is, estoppel is invoked when, subsequent to the entry of the
decree of dissolution, the complaining party has engaged in
conduct inconsistent with the assertion that the decree is in-
49. See authorities cited note 17 supra. See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS, DIVORCE, ALIMONY AND CUSTODY § 11.2, at 291 (1968).
50. Summers v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. 2d 295, 347 P.2d 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 324
(1959).
51. Id.; Roberts v. Roberts, 81 Cal. App. 2d 871, 881, 185 P.2d 381, 386 (1947),
partially disapproved, Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 219, 317 P.2d 613, 619
(1957); Kegley v. Kegley, 16 Cal. App. 2d 216, 220, 60 P.2d 482, 484 (1936); 1 B. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction § 10 at 534 (2d ed. 1971); cf. notes 9-11 supra.
52. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 219, 317 P.2d 613, 619 (1957); Union
Bank & Trust Co. v. Gordon, 116 Cal. App. 2d 681, 254 P.2d 644 (1953); cf. Estate of
Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975); Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App.
3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974); Stoner v. Nethercutt, 8 Cal. App. 3d 667, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 659 (1970); Brown v. Brown, 274 Cal. App. 2d 178, 82 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1969).
53. See Rosenberg, How Void is a Void Decree, or The Estoppel Effect of Invalid
Divorce Decrees, 8 FAM. L.Q. 207 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rosenberg].
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valid, usually meriting the application of estoppel. Thus, es-
toppel has been defined as
[tihe effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby
he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity from
asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise ex-
isted, either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as
against another person who has in good faith relied upon
such conduct and has been led thereby to change his posi-
tion for the worse, and who on his part acquires some corre-
sponding right, either of property, or contract, or of rem-
edy.5 4
Estoppel is applied by the courts in various situations in-
volving different conduct by the parties. Knowledge,55 includ-
ing rumors,56 of the circumstances surrounding an invalid mar-
riage may preclude a party from later asserting its invalidity,
as where the party is aware that a prior divorce decree is in-
valid. Similarly, remarriage of one of the parties weighs heavily
in favor of applying estoppel,5" as well as lengthy delay in as-
serting the invalidity.58 While estoppel generally is applied only
against "wrongdoers," 9 the court also may use it to prevent a
party from procuring a windfall."0 That is, the court generally
will apply estoppel if it would be unfair to let a party take
advantage of the invalidity of the marriage. Estoppel, as ap-
plied in matrimonial disputes, is thus broader than traditional
estoppel in that elements of detrimental reliance are of less
importance to the court's decision.6'
The courts have utilized the notion of divisible divorce,
wherein the marital status of the parties is viewed as separate
and distinct from their respective property rights," in attempt-
54. Brown v. Brown, 274 Cal. App. 2d 178, 188, 82 Cal. Rptr. 238, 244-45 (1969).
55. Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal. 2d 497, 261 P.2d 269 (1953); Schotte v. Schotte,
203 Cal. App. 2d 28, 21 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1962); Rudnick v. Rudnick, 131 Cal. App. 2d
227, 280 P.2d 96 (1955).
56. Smith v. Smith, 157 Cal. App. 2d 46, 320 P.2d 100 (1958).
57. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 219, 317 P.2d 613, 619 (1957); Estate of
Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975); Chilcott v. Chilcott, 257 Cal.
App. 2d 868, 65 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1968).
58. Brown v. Brown, 274 Cal. App. 2d 178, 82 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1969).
59. Id.; Roberts v. Roberts, 81 Cal. App. 2d 871, 185 P.2d 381 (1947), partially
disapproved, Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 219, 317 P.2d 613, 619 (1957).
60. Stoner v. Nethercutt, 8 Cal. App. 3d 667, 87 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1970); Brown
v. Brown, 274 Cal. App. 2d 178, 82 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1969); Estate of Shank, 154 Cal.
App. 2d 808, 316 P.2d 710 (1957).
61. See Rosenburg, supra note 53.
62. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948).
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ing to cure the collateral ills of the application of estoppel; but
this concept has proved more confusing than salutory.63 Indeed,
this concept is more of a stop-gap measure which has been
utilized to bridge the interval between the older, more strin-
gent laws regarding marital relations and newer, more liberal
laws.
It would seem that at the present time, given the state of
the law and the basis upon which it is applied, equitable estop-
pel is a lesser evil than res judicata as a solution to problems
presented by a party's attack on an invalid divorce decree. 4
Since the application of estoppel turns on the conduct of the
parties, the chances that by its application a just result will
ensue are greatly enhanced. Questions of conduct are qualita-
tive, while res judicata deals only with whether the party had
an opportunity to present his claim, not with the merits of that
claim.
However, rather than turning the validity of a judicial act
on an issue of subsequent behavior of the parties, it would seem
that the better solution would be either to change jurisdictional
requisites or to require a more exhaustive, more complete in-
vestigation by the court into the facts surrounding the marriage
of the parties, regardless of whether or not one of the parties
raised the issue of the marriage's validity. Since California
courts currently find themselves dividing community assets
where there is no community, jurisdictional rules should
change to conform to reality or the courts should accept respon-
sibility for their actions. The current practice of foisting the
blame on the parties only encourages subsequent litigation,
and overlooks the fact that it was the court which made the
erroneous "finding," as a consequence of its ready acceptance
of the parties' representation.
In support of present practices, one can argue that juris-
dictional parameters need not be rigidly observed, since
[t]he law of jurisdiction of the courts is neither procedural
nor substantive law. It has nothing to do with either the
63. Rosenburg, supra note 53, at 208.
64. Equity acts in order to meet the requirements of every case, and to satisfy
the need of progressive social conditions in which new primary rights and duties are
constantly arising and new kinds of wrongs are constantly committed. Wuest v. Wuest,
53 Cal. App. 2d 339, 346, 127 P.2d 934, 937 (1942), as cited in Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal.
App. 3d 714, 718, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (1974).
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creation or recognition of substantive rights, it is simply a
limitation on the power of a court to act as a court. '5
Nonetheless, if the court unknowingly acts without juris-
diction, without the power which the legislature and the courts
themselves have declared is necessary for the entry of a valid
decree, the court's judgment is imposed upon the parties unless
it is brought to the attention of the court that it has so acted.
If the decree is subsequently held to be immune from attack
irrespective of its inherent invalidity due to lack of jurisdiction,
the court's decree still is operative upon the parties and will be
enforced. Although theoretically jurisdictional requisites are
only operative upon the power of the court, certainly it cannot
be gainsaid that jurisdictional decisions do subsequently affect
the substantive rights of the parties. If a party is left without
a forum in which to assert his or her rights, the result is as
much a binding determination as a full-scale trial on the merits
of the case. If one is barred from raising a jurisdictional defect
and the illegal act of a court is thereby deemed effective, cer-
tainly one must question whether the party adversely affected
was afforded due process of law.
DUE PROCESS
One of an individual's most important due process rights
is that without an opportunity to be heard by a body competent
to determine such matters, an individual may not be deprived
of his freedom or property. His right to due process may be
violated by the judicial as well as the executive and legislative
branches of government." "The court must have jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter of the action, and...
the parties must have reasonable notice and an opportunity for
hearing." 7
Thus, the due process issue is not the correctness of a given
decision, but the power of the court to determine the issue
presented-that is, its jurisdiction:
[D]ue process of law is met where, as here, the court has
65. Gavit, Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata, 80 U. PA. L. REV.
386, 386 (1932).
66. 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 281, at 3571
(8th ed. 1974); cf. Cugat v. Cugat, 102 Cal. App. 2d 760, 762, 228 P.2d 31, 32 (1951).
67. Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal. App. 2d 613, 621, 343 P.2d 977, 982 (1959); cf.
Harrington v. Superior Ct., 194 Cal. 185, 188, 228 P. 15, 16 (1924); Scott v. McNeal,
154 U.S. 34, 37-38 (1894); R. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW, 596 (1973).
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jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, even
though the court might erroneously determine a question
within that jurisdiction. Jurisdiction implies the power of
the court to decide a question wrongly as well as rightly."
The due process test is not satisfied merely because a court
is empowered to hear the kind of case before it if the court fails
to perform some act necessary to acquire jurisdiction.
If the statute requires as the initial step in the process of
depriving a man of his property the performance of a spe-
cifically defined act, unless that act be performed substan-
tially no jurisdictional power exists for-further action in the
proceeding against him. 9
Indeed, in such circumstances, an act by a court which oper-
ates to establish its jurisdiction is a prerequisite to due pro-
cess.70
A court which fails to make adequate inquiry into the basis
of its jurisdiction by accepting the representation of the parties
rather than making its own examination of the jurisdictional
facts, may be said to deny due process. Unfortunately, while it
seems sound to argue that an individual has been denied due
process of law when a court acts without its jurisdiction and
materially affects the individuals interests and rights, this view
has little support where the party had an opportunity to raise
the jurisdictional defect and failed to do so.
The obstacle to a successful'due process argument against
the practice of barring collateral attack on an invalid decree of
dissolution is that a party who had notice of the pending di-
vorce*proceedings and made an appearance or chose not to
appear, had ample opportunity to raise the jurisdictional de-
fect during the proceeding. Ignorance at the time of the decree
of facts which gave rise to his or her subsequent application for
relief has been held to afford no defense in such situations. 7'
Further, it has also been held that long usage of a given proce-
dure will be sufficient to fulfill the requirements of due pro-
68. Taliaferro v. Bekin Realty Co., 176 Cal. App. 2d 240, 243, 1 Cal. Rptr. 385,
386 (1959); see Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal. App. 2d 613, 621-22, 343 P.2d 977, 982 (1959).
69. Beck v. Ransome Crummery Co., 42 Cal. App. 674, 679, 184 P. 431, 433
(1919); cf. Overall v. Overall, 18 Cal. App. 2d 499, 502, 64 P.2d 483, 484 (1937).
70. Cf. Abelleria v. Dist. Ct. Appeals, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 291, 109 P.2d 942, 948
(1941).
71. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1946); cf. United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
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cess72 where ignorance is claimed.73 Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has held that due process does not require a
judicial proceeding,74 implying that if a judicial body acts with-
out jurisdiction, the individual is still afforded due process.
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the problems presented by a party's at-
tack on an invalid decree of dissolution are paradoxical and
complex. The solutions currently being effected by the courts
are attempts to reach a just result in a given case. In practice,
invoking equitable estoppel generally does produce a fair re-
sult.
However, the violence done to jurisdictional parameters
and to the individual's right to appeal the jurisdictional error
of the court, raises serious questions as to the worth of these
solutions. It is true, of course, that the courts must attempt to
resolve controversies which are not readily accessible to present
legal remedies. But when the attempted resolution creates a
significant line of cases in conflict with basic legal principles,
it becomes evident that a new approach is required. Where the
need to do justice leaves the court no choice but to create a
category of legal aberrations, the law must change to meet the
challenge.
The need for a reconsideration of jurisdictional requisites
in domestic relations litigation is clear. Jurisdictional parame-
ters currently in force are ineffectual in this area and are more
often overlooked than followed. 75 With the rising frequency of
in propia persona dissolution actions, the chance that the juris-
dictional defect will not be discovered during the proceedings,
and that an unjust result will ensue, increases commensur-
ately. The law establishes rules and procedures in order to
settle disputes amicably and establish guidelines for prospec-
tive litigants. When these rules and procedures are not fol-
lowed, the resultant confusion leads to more litigation, more
judicial time expended. Thus, the individual who ventures to
settle his own marital dispute seriously jeopardizes his inter-
ests. Even the aid of an attorney will not immunize him from
the misunderstanding which pervades this area of the law.
72. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
73. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Twinning v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 79 (1908).
74. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
75. Harper, The Validity of Void Divorces, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 158, 165 (1930).
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It would seem that a fuller investigation by the court of the
circumstances surrounding the parties' marriage, or a require-
ment that the basic forms of pleading include a full statement
of the jurisdictional facts which the court must notice before
making its finding, would justify the current reliance on res
judicata or equitable estoppel. However, the current practice
of accepting without question the litigants' bald representation
that they are validly married provides little basis for their ap-
plication. While it is doubtful that the suggested investigation
would prove overly burdensome to the courts, another alterna-
tive is to change the jurisdictional requisites, perhaps explicitly
allowing the parties to a divorce action to consent to the juris-
diction of the court.
The state's interest in the marital status of the parties
surely cannot be said to extend to retroactive conferral of a
marital status on individuals, when the only reason for its
interest is to give effect to the mutual desire and consent of the
parties. The state cannot be said to desire to dissolve a status
which never existed, to desire divorce without marriage.
Randall M. Widmann
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